Insurance: a short description (2)

Jun 24
2009

With the increasing use of derivatives and the impending deadlines of Basel II, we should see more variety in the types of insurance policies to cover foreseeable loss events. Insurance provides a safety net for sustaining losses where the costs in a single period would be too punitive. If the risk is deemed too large to handle singly by the company and collectively by shareholders, the risk must be transferred out and dispersed among a wider pool.
Insurance is the latest but one line of defence against risk, after capital reserves and before benefiting from bankruptcy law. It does not protect against risk but just smoothens the risk over time, transforming risks into costs. Pooling by transferring to institutions with more capital; or transferring to those who know the risk better.
Insurance results in a transfer of insurable risk into a tail credit risk and a host of legal risks. For these reasons of legal friction and contractual costs, insurance ends up a very incomplete market. A lot of risks are not covered at any price other than at excessive levels because of the paucity of up-to-date market information and the risk-aversion of many companies. If financial markets were as incomplete as insurance, a considerable number of arbitrages between market segments would not be possible, and trading would be minimal.
The effects of large impact disasters, certainly after the emergence of terrorist waves post 9/11, and the collapse of stock-market prices are causes for concern. The major worries for the insurance industry are that they:
will not be able to pay the insurance liabilities of clients’ claims
will reduce their cover by expanding exclusion clauses, so that clients will find self-insurance protection more attractive
When we are unsure of a specific type of risk, e.g. with complex damage or liability risk, a convenient get-out is to pass it to the insurer. You can protect yourself better against investment or corporate failure – for a premium. Thus, a popular policy was the D&O insurance – the Director and Officer cover. A company could cover the performance of its key staff, as well as protect against shareholder lawsuits through purchasing this policy. Unfortunately, with the rise in company scandals and accounts restatements post-AEW, this D&O cover has become more expensive. So, General Electric found its D&O policy quadrupling within one year.
Market players should familiarise themselves with the idea that buying insurance not solve all their risk problems. Furthermore, investors and company chiefs should acquaint themselves with the basic techniques of risk maps and loss databases to provide advance warning of potential corporate damage. Funnily enough, the insurers are the ones who are most likely to have understood the benefits of a loss database and created one, years before the banks and managed funds.
Do the groundwork – you need to be:
Assessing areas of risk weakness or corporate vulnerability.
Assessing cost-benefits of buying in risk management expertise or cover.
Assessing areas of non-coverage for corporate cover.
Read the small-print beforehand in great detail, there are obvious advantages to be gained. Corporations and individuals have become used to retaining risk that would have been insured. Insurers trap the cost of losses over time, charging their expenses for the risk burden. Insurance provides a safety-net for sustaining losses where the costs in a single period would be too punitive. The normal view was that a corporation takes a diversified portfolio of investments plus their associated risks. The increasingly common perspective will be to view enterprise risk management (ERM) status of the client.
This means that clients will be assessed upon the value and quality of their portfolio, plus to what degree they have the tools, techniques and business processes to manage risk. This is analogous to the Basel II view of operational risk. The insurer would work progressively with the client to develop strategies, implement them tactically and monitor business performance. A hands-off “just post us the premium cheque” will be less commonplace. More detailed inspection will take place before policies are signed.
If the risk is deemed too large to handle singly, the risk is farmed out or dispersed. The directors and shareholders will tend to shun investments where the insurance premiums eat too much of the associated profits. The idea of ceasing to buy insurance is not new, the investor can take on the total potential loss.

Insurance: a short description (1)

Jun 24
2009

Insurance is looking at the other side, assuming that there is a significant chance that external risk events will strike or that the corporate leadership will be anything but sound. There are residual risks that are difficult to calculate, or know about for sure if they never happened to you. These are particularly true in operational risk. Part of this ignorance or uncertainty is because companies have not created, or cannot gain access to, the relevant knowledge base. The investment risk of fixed capital assets can be insured on the institutional market, such as houses or industrial plant equipment. There are risks of specific catastrophic events to insure against, e.g. fire, flood or storms.
Marsh McClellan insurance company sees systemic risk as that which affects the whole enterprise. It takes the definition:
Enterprise risk management: the process of systematically and comprehensively identifying critical risks, quantifying their impacts, and implementing integrated risk management strategies to maximize enterprise value.
This is investment risk management in the banking sense.
Insurance has a choice of risk strategies (sometimes more than banking):
Accept it, finance the risk burden.
Transfer it, e.g. insurance.
Mitigation, damage-limitation exercises.
Leave business completely (bankruptcy).
Insurers and bankers come from different parts of the risk spectrum. Different types of risk expertise are found on both sides of the insurance–banking border. Banks handled risk pooling, for credit risk, as well as risk financing. Banks’ access to capital markets gave them better access to capital than insurers. Banks took credit risk in lending operations as their normal bread-and-butter, and worked under market risk as an intermediary, e.g. a broker. Insurers worked in direct acceptance and management of risk. They engaged in risk pooling – taking unrelated risks so that the average losses are regular. Otherwise, they could choose risk absorption where they could afford to take the risks because of stronger financial backing, or risk financing to maintain liquidity to pay for the risk events. Insurers have the structural tools to provide risk management support:
captives
risk funding
risk transfer
risk financing.
Insurance business was traditionally about transferring risk. It created value in pooling risk, therefore lowering upper-band risk limits to any single party. It could also pool different types of risks under diversification to obtain heterogeneity of the risk portfolio, thus lowering risk impact of any one single risk. It would transfer risks to the people who have deeper knowledge about these specific risks and/or who could afford to insure them. The captives act as specialist intermediaries between banks that are worried by operational risk and want insurance cover for it, and the international reinsurance and retrocession market.
Insurers can advise about management of certain risks, and financial markets being used to transfer risks. The justification for insurance is, thus, the right specialist information with adequate financial backing. Note the Lloyds’ Names scandal, which dealt in specialised risk and reinsured it within the same group of companies. The wrong information and skills, with localisation of risk burden, cropped up again in the Investment Fund “Splits” fiasco. Specialist knowledge over what the insurance policy does not cover, how much it costs, alternative forms of protection are basic business starting points. Sometimes, this start line is ignored for businesses that think they are covered. At the most basic level, the evaluated expectation of risk should be more than the insurance premium paid, i.e.
Risk expectation = Sum of all (risk event × damage)
Risk damage expectation > insurance premium paid
This test will generally give a negative result, where the premiums plus the costs of transfer are greater than the damage. Therefore, the insurance company profits. Such a calculation would give a satisfactory result only if the client had an asymmetry of information and knew better than the insurance company his a priori probability of suffering damage. The 1980s’ Lloyds’ errors in home appliance insurance came about because the insurance companies miscalculated that there was a lower risk of electric gadgets going wrong. The resultant malfunctions and claims cost Lloyds’ insurers more than average losses.